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Abstract  
 
Elite occupations are characterised by the magnitude of income accumulation. This paper however shows that 
the cumulative effects on group earnings is a pattern visible across the strata of the society. The literature on 
identity, stratification, and intersectionality has long shown the importance of group identity in explaining the 
persistence of income inequality. By taking a group perspective to individuals, the contribution of this paper is 
to reveal that elitist earnings, whereby one group earn disproportionately at the expense of other 
demographic groups at the occupational level, exist across the labour force. The case studies on the US and UK 
labour force show that elitist earnings is a group phenomenon, not specific to elitist occupations. There is in 
effect a pattern of elitist earnings across occupations for a dominant group, mainly white male or female, at 
the expense of other racial, ethnic, and gender groups. 
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1. Introduction  
The accumulation of earning excesses in the financial sector is now widely recognized to be one of the features 
of the evolution of income distribution over the past century (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Piketty, 2014). One 
potential explanation put forward by Piketty and Saez (2003) is the role of norms in exacerbating earnings at the 
top of the income distribution. In effect, identity reinforcement and norms exacerbation at the top of managerial 
and financial occupations have been essential factors which have led to financial excesses. In the US and in 
Europe, this movement of income went towards a specific demographic group, namely white men in managerial 
and financial occupations (Author A; Denk, 2015). Therefore, it makes us wonder the extent to which elitist 
earnings exist at the group level, whereby identity groups earn a disproportionate share of income at the 
expense of other groups across all occupations. As such, the earning behaviour of the elite could be the visible 
part of the iceberg, given the extent of their earnings, which might not be linked to the behaviour of elitist 
individuals but to a group of individuals across the labour force. In effect, we argue here that the dynamics of 
income accumulation over time are characterised by group-based rather than individual-based behaviour across 
the labour force.  
The contribution of this paper is to characterize elitist earnings according to the long-run trend of group’s 
earnings vis-à-vis others, and to test for their existence in the US and the UK occupations. As such, the long-run 
trend of elitist earnings by group at the occupational level is overshooting vis-à-vis other groups, while other 
groups’ earnings are constant over time, and hence are not benefiting from occupational income growth in the 
long-run. The literature on identity (Stryker, 1968; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Ashforth and Mael, 1989), 
stratification (Darity and Williams, 1985; Mason, 1996), and intersectionality (hooks, 1981; Crenshaw, 1989) has 
long shown the importance of group identity in explaining market interactions as a subset of social interactions. 
As such, the ‘social variables’ mentioned by Arrow are in fact linked to the relationships of power between 
groups reflecting local cultural norms (Lamont et al., 2014; Massey et al., 2014). Starting from such a rich 
literature as a background, this paper assumes that individuals are defined at the intersection of stratified group 
identities whose social positioning depends on the contextual norms in which they evolve. 
Accepting that group behaviour overtakes individual behaviour in the social setting leads us to rethink the way 
group behaviour influences income movements across the economy and the society over time. Across social 
sciences, despite the recognition of the importance of group behaviour, the methodology used to measure 
income inequality is based on the individual, whereby individual income as a dependent variable is regressed 
against independent variables such as education, experience, gender, race and so on (Tienda and Lii, 1987). In 
effect, despite being central to the issue of income inequality, membership of individuals to social groups is 
often ignored (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2011), or group membership excludes professional 
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categories (Schnelder, 2013). Taking a group perspective of individuals, this paper departs from methodological 
individualism and marginalism by using a long-run methodology on group earnings.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical background. Section 2.1 describes the role of 
group behaviour in market interactions and in the labour market in particular, thus showing how a dominant 
group can persist over time. Section 2.2 then looks at the impact of time on the dynamics of income 
accumulation through stratification and intersectionality effects in the labour force. Section 3 elaborates the 
phenomenon of elitist earnings across occupations. Finally, Section 4 offers two case studies on the presence of 
elitist earnings in the US (1968-2011) and UK (2001-2014) labour forces looking at racial, gender, and 
occupational stratification. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Group Behaviour and Social Identity 
 
The elite emerging from the changes in global income distribution over the past 50 years seems to be 
increasingly diverse in nature and international in scope, but most research still focuses on the supremacy of 
the white, male, Protestant trinity of power (Khan, 2012). The increasing diversity of the elite also means 
however that individuals within that group experience very different opportunities (Ashley and Empson 2016; 
Khan, 2012). This section goes back to the literature on identity to show how such diversity of experiences in 
the elite reflects, to a large extent, the experiences of individuals with different identities outside the elite group. 
While this section is not aimed at covering the wide range of literature on identity and group identification,1 the 
non-exhaustive cross-disciplinary literature review presented here enables us to trace the role of social groups 
in defining the individual. By doing so, we are able to adopt a dynamic view of the individual at the unique 
intersection of stratified group identities, and whose social and economic positioning depends on the contextual 
norms in which they evolve. Hence, the behaviour of individuals with diverse identities within the elite group in 
effect results from the socially constructed group relationships at the societal level. 
The concept of identity is related to the fact that individuals are attached to social categories to which they feel 
a sense of belonging, such as ethnicity, gender, age, sexuality, profession, culture or religion. Social interactions 
are central to the identity literature in sociology, especially from Stryker’s work (Stryker, 1968). Such tradition 
departs from methodological individualism by showing the importance of relationships in shaping personal and 
social identities. Stryker in effect argues that the heterogeneity of identities of one individual comes through 
the multiple roles he or she plays in increasingly complex and diverse societies. The sociological origin of 
research on identity is therefore based on individual agency whereby an individual actively negotiates his or her 
roles and relationship with others (Casey and Dustmann, 2010). Here, the emphasis is on the two-way 
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relationship between the individual and society and how social interactions shape personal identities. Taking 
these different traditions together leads us to map an individual with multiple group identities whose agency 
and decision-making depend on the groups to which they belong. 
A growing body of literature now distinguishes between group and individual behaviour (Bornstein et al., 2004; 
Charness and Sutter, 2012; Muehlheusser et al., 2015). This literature shows that in an experimental laboratory 
setting, group behaviour tends to be more self-centred and predictable than individual behaviour. Bornstein and 
Kugler and Ziegelmeyer (2004) for example provide evidence from strategic games experiments that groups are 
more rational, in the sense of maximising each group player’s own payoff, that they are less pro-social and make 
less errors than individuals. Groups behave as such by assuming that other groups will behave identically, thus 
triggering a self-reinforcing norm of behaviour to fulfil the group’s aspiration of higher payoffs. Interestingly, 
since the groups in the experiments were randomly-assigned, it is impossible to know the role played by the 
identity of the group players in the group decision-making process. However, Muehlheusser and Roider and 
Wallmeier (2015) provide a clue by adding the gender identity to their game-theoretic experiments. They find 
that male-based and mixed-gender based groups are more prone to lying than female-based groups.  
2.2 The Impact of Time on Group Behaviour: Stratification and Intersectionality 
 
The relative value assigned to social groups is mostly historically-determined and culturally embedded 
(Bourdieu, 1984; Prasad and Qurechi, 2016; Clegg et al., 2006). The literature on stratification for example shows 
how race and ethnic group disparities in market outcomes can be sustained and exacerbated over time (Darity 
and Williams, 1985; Massey, 2007; Grusky and Weisshaar, 2014). Social norms then serve as rules for 
reproducing advantages of certain social groups at the expense of others. Brown and Yang (2015) for instance 
show the discrepancies between the performance of female and male jockeys, a profession where men and 
women can compete equally, and the market value assigned to their group through the betting system. They 
find that women are especially underestimated in jump racing, a race category with low female participation. 
Here, the combined effect of professional and gender identities leads to a worse outcome for women in jump 
racing than in other forms of racing. Similarly, on how group advantages are also reproduced over time at the 
intersection of geography and education, evidence for England and Wales shows that a large number of 
employers offering the top-paid jobs in the country target an average of only 19 universities in the UK for those 
jobs (Milburn, 2012, Dorling, 2013). These examples go beyond the issue of statistical discrimination (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2004) since group productivity in that instance, as in all occupations, has been shown not to 
be responsible for income inequality (Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs, 1999). The problem of the combined effect 
of identities on inequality has been formalised in the literature on intersectionality.  
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The literature on intersectionality argues that the sum of identities can lead to worse discriminating outcomes 
than considering identities separately (hooks, 1981; Crenshaw, 1989; McCall, 2005). Compared with implicit 
discrimination, which argues that discriminatory behaviour by individuals may be unconscious (Bertrand et al., 
2005), the concept of intersectionality departs from methodological individualism by rejecting the boundaries 
that can possibly be drawn between groups. This stream of research originally comes from black feminism as a 
critique of traditional feminist theory which tends to consider all women as a single group regardless of the fact 
that combining gender with racial and class identities may lead to different discriminatory outcomes. From this 
perspective, group membership is socially assigned by a dominant standard, as shown in the next section, rather 
than individually chosen, consciously or unconsciously. At the firm level, it means that two individuals with 
similar abilities, skills and education but with two different sets of social identities are likely to face unequal 
business, job, and salary opportunities. Ruwanpura (2008) for example demonstrates how cultural and gender 
identities influence managerial decisions: in 2006, a female secondary teacher in the UK was dismissed for 
wearing a veil, while in the same year, a female employee at the British Airways check-in desk was put on 
probation for wearing a cross on her necklace. Despite sharing a female identity, the social and corporate 
perception of both gender and religious identities interacted in such a way to produce different decisional 
outcomes based on a dominant ethical standard of what is deemed acceptable. 
Starting with both concepts of stratification and intersectionality, it seems reasonable to argue that individuals 
tend to perceive, unconsciously or consciously, their social interactions to be with groups rather individuals. 
Individuals tend to make decisions according to the salient group, dominant in a particular context, out of the 
multiple identity groups to which they belong. Whether group decisions are rational according to a standard of 
payoff maximization, as in the banking industry (Cohn and Fehr and Maréchal, 2014), or according to the 
prescribed ethical standards  in the society, the economy or the environment, the way individual identities are 
stratified and intersect with one another determines the salient ethical standard ruling the market and social 
interactions. Therefore, given the importance of group decision in social interactions, we define elitist earnings 
at a group level rather individual level. As such, we wonder whether some identity groups are more inclined to 
receive elitist earnings than others and if so, whether such earning behaviour spreads to the entire labour force 
rather than to the top 1% of the income distribution. 
 
3. Elitist Earnings Across Occupations 
In the context of labour market interactions, ideals of market identities set the criteria of optimality in the 
allocation of jobs and wages in the labour market. The identity of the profit-maximizing producer or utility-
maximizing consumer are essential to understand market behaviours, but accepting that market agents have 
multiple identities lead to a more complex view of market agents. If market agents have multiple identities, it 
follows that the optimality point in the programs of profit-maximization and utility-maximization can be 
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influenced by these multiple identities. In the context of labour market interactions for example, the dominant 
social identity of the profit-maximizing producer may influence labour demand decisions. Hiring and firing 
decisions are likely to be influenced by the identity to which the decision-maker belongs, essentially to minimize 
the uncertainty of dealing with unknown behavioural norms associated with other groups’ identity. The 
“dominant” standard of an identity group in the labour market will determine whether the outcome is fair or 
not according to that standard. Hence, the persistence of occupational segregation over time by race, ethnicity 
and gender is well-documented (Charles, 1992; Chang, 2000; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2006) in terms of 
occupational norm sustainability. As norms emerge, an ideal sets the criteria of optimal behaviour which is 
identity-specific and serve as a basis for social interactions. Belonging to a group sharing a common ideal 
engender a sense of identity for its group members. Goette et al. (2006) show how group membership creates 
social ties which lead group members to enforce a norm of cooperation between them.  
Economic justice is based on the premises that everyone should receive the income they deserve whereby each 
unit of labour and capital receive their rewards from the production process (Lyman, 1920). The time dimension 
of the production process brings to this marginalist view the problem of power relationships in the distribution 
of production revenues. Adding the identity element to the production process means that the units of labour 
can be understood from the perspective of groups based on race, ethnicity, gender, age, occupation, and so on. 
Each group behaves rationally according to the group’s interest and a dominant group influences the distribution 
of the rewards of labour productivity according to the group interest. In the labour market, groups of interest 
may be composed of employers, employees, or stakeholders, whose norms of fairness may differ from one 
another depending on the perspective adopted. The fair wage-effort approach to efficiency wages takes the 
relational perspective of both employers and employees (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). This hypothesis argues that 
wages are set above market clearing levels essentially because employers have a perception of how much they 
should pay for a given work or effort, as much as employees have a perception of how much they should be paid 
for a given work or effort. In other words, the market identity of agents influences their perception of fairness 
and labour market outcomes as a result, including job opportunities and relative wages. Based on the fair-wage 
hypothesis, Author A shows how the  cultural perception of the Mexican gender identity translates into an 
increasing gender wage gap between male and female maquiladora workers over time. For employers and 
employees, both supply of labour and demand for labour depend on the price of labour. However, given that 
the monitoring of individual performance and effort is difficult, determining the price of labour for a type of 
worker must rely on a perceived social value of one of the identities of worker. Assuming that effort is not 
measurable and varies across individuals, the assessment of the value of a particular identity relies to some 
extent on the social perception of this identity outside the workplace. For example, as demonstrated by Brown 
and Yang (2015) in the jockey profession and Author B in the case of social entrepreneurs, social norms place a 
relative value on gender groups.  
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Let us assume a society with two demographic group identities i and j, both belonging to the same occupational 
group k. Therefore, individuals are composed of group identities i and k, or composed of group identities j and 
k. The elitist identity is represented by j and received a group premium for group membership while the non-
elitist identity is represented by i whose earnings are discriminated against due to group membership.  At the 
level of the economy, let us assume national output: 𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐿 with K for capital and r for its 
marginal product or rate of profit, and with L for labour and w for its marginal product or wage. At the societal 
level, the sum of earnings from capital and labour 𝑧 = ∑(𝑟 + 𝑤) is then distributed between all identity groups 
such that 𝑍 = 𝑧(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘). Over time, assuming 𝑍𝑡  follows a trend-stationary process such that 𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
where 𝛼 is a constant, 𝑡 is a deterministic trend, and 𝜀𝑡 is a white noise term, then the nature of the long-run 
process gives us a classification of elitist versus non-elitist earnings. Starting from a general model of the Dickey-
Fuller (DF) unit root test, 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜙𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
or 
∆𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜑𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝜑 = 𝜙 − 1 and ∆𝑍𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡−1. Earnings are non-elitist if: 
 ∆𝑧(𝑘)𝑡 = 𝜑𝑧(𝑘)𝑡−1 + 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  (if 𝜑 < 0 trend-stationary process), 
or; ∆𝑧(𝑖)𝑡 = 𝜑𝑧(𝑖)𝑡−1 + 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑡 (if 𝜑 < 0 stationary process around a non-zero value), 
or ∆𝑧(𝑖)𝑡 = 𝜑𝑧(𝑖)𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  (if 𝜑 < 0 stationary process around a zero value), 
and earnings are elitist if: 
 ∆𝑧(𝑗)𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡  (if 𝜑 = 0 non-stationary process ) with 𝜀𝑡 following the random walk of the evolving 
inequalities. An overview of the null (non-stationarity) and the alternative (stationarity) hypothesis of the 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) unit root test is provide in Table 1, where 𝜇 indicates an overall mean of the process, and 𝛿 
is a constant growth (drift) in the model of first difference of a non-stationary series (Hill et al., 2011).  
Table 1. Autoregressive (AR) Processes and the Dickey-Fuller (DF) Test 
 AR processes: |𝜙1| < 1 Setting: 𝜙1 = 1 DF Test 
(1) 𝑍𝑡 = 𝜙𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 No constant, no trend 
(2) 𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜙𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝛼 = 𝜇(1 − 𝜙) 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝛼 = 0 
Constant, no trend 
(3) 𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜙𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝛼 = 𝜇(1 − 𝜙) + 𝜙𝛿 
𝛽 = 𝛿(1 − 𝜙) 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝛿 + 𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝛼 = 𝛿 
𝛽 = 0 
Constant and trend 
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If the earnings variable of an identity group is non-stationary, it means that there is a persistent cumulation of 
past effects (shocks) (Hendry and Juselius, 2001) leading to sustained changes in earnings. If the earnings 
variable of an identity group is stationary, it means that their earnings remain constant over the period. 
Stationary earnings are not benefiting from the increase in occupational earnings over the period and they are 
assumed to be compensating for a movement of income towards non-stationary earnings. Hence, non-
stationary (stochastic trend) earnings are “elitist” in comparison to trend-stationary (deterministic-trend) or 
stationary earnings in the sense that a percentile of income distribution experiences shocks that cumulate in the 
long-run while other percentiles do not. In effect, trend-stationary “non-elitist” earnings represent a percentile 
of income distribution whose long-run trend grow at an arithmetic rate, while stationary “non-elitist” earnings 
represent a percentile of income distribution whose long-run trend is constant. 
4. Methodology: Identifying Elitist Earnings Across Occupations 
Despite the recognition of the importance of group behaviour in determining income inequality, the empirical 
methodology used in the literature is still mainly based on the individual, with individual income used as 
dependent variable against control variables such as education, experience, gender, race and so on (Tienda and 
Lii, 1987). Departing from methodological individualism requires taking groups at the primary unit of analysis. 
In the context of the US labour market, racial and gender discrimination remain a prominent feature regardless 
of age, experience, or education (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Schnelder, 2013). Therefore, the main 
hypothesis tested is whether similar gender and racial identities at the occupational level earn elitist earnings, 
as defined above, compared to other gender and racial identities. Using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, 
the methodology consists of testing whether the earnings of each identity group in each occupation are non-
stationary, trend-stationary or stationary over the analysed period. By doing so, we are able to categorise the 
pattern followed by the earnings of each group across occupations as elitist or not. We use nominal instead of 
real earnings to account for money illusion including price stickiness, and lack of inflation-indexation on labour 
contracts and laws. We use means rather than median earnings in order to account for the information provided 
by outliers. In other words, we are interested in exploring the raw information provided by groups’ earnings 
along the income stratification spectrum. 
 
4.1 US Occupations (1968-2011) 
 
Using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data (King et al., 2010), this first case study looks at the long-run 
behaviour of earnings by gender and racial groups across occupations in the US labour force between 1968 and 
2011. In accordance with the literature on the US stratification using CPS data (Arestis and Charles and Fontana, 
2014), the gender and racial identity group included are white men (wm), black men (bm), Hispanic men (hm), 
white women (wf), black women (bf), and Hispanic women (hf). We use the current annual weekly earnings of 
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the above mentioned identity groups for 27 consistent occupational groups over the period 1968-2011, as 
displayed in Tables 2 to 7, respectively. Earnings are the annual average of usual weekly earnings of employed 
full-time wage and salary workers by group. 
Apart from health and personal services with 89 and 78 percent female labour force, Table 2 shows that white 
men experience non-stationary earnings across all occupations. In comparison, Tables 3 and 4 show that black 
and Hispanic men experience trend-stationary and/or stationary earnings in many occupations, in professional 
occupations in particular. Black men experience stationary and trend-stationary earnings in a wider variety of 
occupations than Hispanic men. For example, in managerial occupations, the earnings of Hispanic men are non-
stationary while the earnings of black men are stationary. Looking at the female part of the labour force, Tables 
5 to 7 show a similar racial and ethnic dichotomy whereby white women experience non-stationary earnings 
across most occupations, while black and Hispanic women experience non-stationary earnings in only a few 
occupations. Here, trend-stationary and stationary earnings for the black and Hispanic groups go beyond 
professional occupations and affect most part of the labour force. Overall, answering the question whether 
earnings are elitist at the group level in the US labour force is dominated by the fact that earnings of white 
workers display cumulative past effects (shocks) across most occupations and gender groups. 
 
4.2 UK Occupations (2001-2014) 
 
Using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, this second case study looks at the long-run behaviour of earnings by 
gender and racial groups across occupations in the UK labour force in the period between 2001 and 2014. The 
gender and racial identity group included are white women (wf), non-white women (nwf), white men (wm), and 
non-white men (nwm). We use the weekly gross (net) pay in the main job and the data is aggregated from the 
individual level as means per quarter. The nine occupational groups using SOC 2000 codes “occupation” are 
consistent over the period 2001Q2-2014Q4. The results for each identity group wf, nwf, wm, and nwm are 
displayed in Tables 8 to 11, respectively.  
 
Starting with the comparison between white and non-white women in Tables 8 and 9, the white female group 
experiences non-stationary earnings in four out of the nine types of occupations. In comparison, the non-white 
female group experiences trend-stationary earnings in all occupations. Similarly for the male groups, the white 
male group experiences non-stationary earnings in four out of the nine types of occupations. In comparison, the 
non-white male group experiences trend-stationary earnings in all occupations. Overall, answering the question 
whether earnings are elitist at the group level in the UK labour force is dominated by the fact that earnings of 
the white labour force display cumulative past effects (shocks) across many occupations and gender groups. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The literature in social sciences on identity, stratification, and intersectionality has long shown the importance 
of group identity in explaining the persistence of income inequality over time. However, methodological 
individualism and marginalism in economics mean that income inequality is still assessed from the perspective 
of the individual with individual income as dependent variable, individual characteristics as control variables, 
and a time trend to assess the path-dependency of inequality. By taking a group perspective to individuals, the 
contribution of this paper is to define and test for elitist earnings across the labour force. The magnitude of 
earning excesses in the financial sector has been argued to be one of the causes of the 2007 crisis. At the 
intersection of occupational, gender and racial norms, the two case studies show that elitist earnings is a group 
phenomenon, not specific to financial and managerial occupations, but it extends to most of the US and UK 
labour forces.  
 
The US and the UK are known to be among the most unequal high income countries, where income and wealth 
inequalities “reinforce” themselves through high health and education inequalities (Dorling, 2013). The 1%, 9% 
and 90% of the income distribution can be thought of as three economic interests groups where, in the long run, 
as one group benefits the other two tend not to.  It has also been established that the rising education outcome 
and skill gaps cannot anymore be explained by the skill biased technological change, which seems to suggest 
that the marginal productivity is an obsolete concept in economics. We contribute to this discussion by 
suggesting that in the most unequal high income countries there is in effect a pattern of elitist earnings across 
occupations for a dominant group, mainly white male or female, at the expense of other racial, ethnic, and 
gender groups. Thus, despite the fact that the elite group is characterised by the magnitude of earning 
accumulation, the cumulative effects on group earnings is a pattern visible across the strata of the society. 
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Notes to all Earnings’ Tables for US occupations (Tables 2 to 7) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the US Current Population Survey (CPS), received through IPUMS. 
Note: Table provides an ADF test-statistic, with the lag length in parentheses. 𝜏𝑡 refers to the ADF test-statistic from a model with a constant and trend. 𝜏𝜇 
refers to the ADF test-statistic from a model with a constant only. Lag selection is based on Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). Relevant critical 
values of the ADF unit root test at 5% significance level are as follows (Fuller, 1976, p. 371): . All 
unit root test results are estimated by Stata. Labels refer to the annual average of usual weekly earnings of employed full-time wage and salary workers for: 
wm = white men, wf = white women, bm = black men, bf = black women, hm = Hispanic men, hf = Hispanic women. Occupations follow the OCC1990 
classification (https://cps.ipums.org/cps-action/variables/OCC1990#description_section) which is consistent over time. 
 
Notes to all Earnings’ Tables for UK occupations (Tables 8-11) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), received through the Data Archive, University of Essex. 
Note: Table provides an ADF test-statistic, with the lag length in parentheses.  refers to the ADF test-statistic from a model with a constant and trend.  
refers to the ADF test-statistic from a model with a constant only. Lag selection is based on the Schwartz information criteria (SIC). Relevant critical values of 
the ADF unit root test at 5% significance level are as follows (Fuller, 1976, p. 371): . Relevant 
critical values of the F-test at 5% significance level are as follows (Dickey and Fuller, 1981, p. 1063): (a) F-test for  
(AR(1) with a drift),  and F-test for  (AR(1) with a drift and a linear time trend), 
; and (b) F-test for ttt uytyinH  10 1,0,0:   (AR(1) with a drift and a linear time trend), . All 
unit root test results are estimated by Stata. Labels refer to: wm = white men, wf = white women, nwm = non-white men, nwf = non-white women, grss = 
gross weekly earnings, net = net weekly earnings. 
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Table 2. US White men (WM): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 1968-2011 (43 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary  
earnings 
Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour 
share in 2011(%) 
Exec., Adm. and Man. occupations     
1. Managerial occupations wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.276 (1)   41.3 
2. Management related occupations wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.879 (1)   55.5 
Professional occupations     
3. Engineers and Scientists wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.724 (1)   23.7 
4. Health diagnosing occ. wm: 𝜏𝑡=-0.797 (1)   77 
5. Teachers wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.145 (2)   74.5 
6. Social Scientists and Urban Planners wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.576 (1)   53.2 
7. Social, Recreations, and Religious Workers wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.598 (1)   63.8 
8. Lawyers and Judges wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.858 (4)   36.2 
9. Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.379 (1)   47 
10. Technicians wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.728 (1)   51.2 
11. Sales occupations wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.290 (1)   51.3 
12. Administrative support occ. wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.285 (1)   73.8 
Service occupations     
13. Household services  wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.566 (2)   90 
14. Protective services wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.621 (1)   21.2 
15. Food services wm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.091 (1)   56.4 
16. Health services  wm: 𝜏𝑡=-5.396 (0) wm 𝜏𝜇=-4.826 (0) 88.8 
17. Cleaning and Building wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.171 (1)   32.4 
18. Personal services  wm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.490 (1) wm 𝜏𝜇=-2.950 (0) 78.5 
19.Farming, forestry, fishing wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.960 (1)   17.6 
Precision production, craft, and repairs occ.     
20. Mechanics wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.570 (1)   3.8 
21. Construction trades wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.743 (2)   2.2 
22. Extractive occupations wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.418 (2)   0.5 
23. Precision occupations wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.185 (1)   32.7 
Operators, fabricators, and labourers     
24. Operators wm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.643 (2)   33 
25. Transportation occupations wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.958 (1)   11.8 
26. Material moving occupations wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.740 (1)   15.2 
27. Military occupations wm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.601 (1)   9.7 
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Table 3. US Black men (BM): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 1968-2011 (43 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary 
 earnings 
Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour 
share in 2011(%) 
Exec., Adm. and Man. occupations     
1. Managerial occupations  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-4.135 (1)  41.3 
2. Management related occupations bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.886 (3)   55.5 
Professional occupations     
3. Engineers and Scientists  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.609 (1) bm: 𝜏𝜇=-2.910 (1) 23.7 
4. Health diagnosing occ.  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-4.054 (1) bm: 𝜏𝜇=-2.600* (1) 77 
5. Teachers  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.227* (1) bm: 𝜏𝜇=-3.115 (1) 74.5 
6. Social Scientists and Urban Planners  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-4.107 (1) bm: 𝜏𝜇=-3.302 (1) 53.2 
7. Social, Recreations, and Religious Workers bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.307 (3)   63.8 
8. Lawyers and Judges  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-5.081 (1) bm: 𝜏𝜇=-3.090 (1) 36.2 
9. Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-4.802 (1) bm: 𝜏𝜇=-3.991 (1) 47 
10. Technicians bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.383 (2)   51.2 
11. Sales occupations   bm: 𝜏𝜇=-2.880 (1) 51.3 
12. Administrative support occ.  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.494 (1)  73.8 
Service occupations     
13. Household services   bm: 𝜏𝑡=-7.449 (0) bm: 𝜏𝜇=-7.215 (0) 90 
14. Protective services bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.445 (1)   21.2 
15. Food services bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.207 (3)   56.4 
16. Health services  bm: 𝜏𝑡=-5.271 (0) bm: 𝜏𝜇=-5.221 (0) 88.8 
17. Cleaning and Building bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.746 (1)   32.4 
18. Personal services bm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.122 (1)   78.5 
19.Farming, forestry, fishing bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.142 (3)   17.6 
Precision production, craft, and repairs occ.     
20. Mechanics bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.159 (2)   3.8 
21. Construction trades bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.537 (1)   2.2 
22. Extractive occupations bm: 𝜏𝑡=-0.965 (3)   0.5 
23. Precision occupations bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.547 (1)   32.7 
Operators, fabricators, and labourers     
24. Operators bm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.554 (1)   33 
25. Transportation occupations bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.920 (1)   11.8 
26. Material moving occupations bm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.264 (1)   15.2 
27. Military occupations bm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.836 (2)   9.7 
Note: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, significance at the 5% level otherwise. 
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Table 4. US Hispanic men (HM): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 1971-2011 (40 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary  
earnings 
Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour 
share in 2011(%) 
Exec., Adm. and Man. occupations     
1. Managerial occupations hm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.389 (1)   41.3 
2. Management related occupations hm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.102 (2)   55.5 
Professional occupations     
3. Engineers and Scientists  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-4.570 (0) hm: 𝜏𝜇=-4.493 (0) 23.7 
4. Health diagnosing occ.  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.414 (1)  77 
5. Teachers  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-6.897 (0) hm: 𝜏𝜇=-7.029 (0) 74.5 
6. Social Scientists and Urban Planners  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-7.033 (0) hm: 𝜏𝜇=-6.984 (0) 53.2 
7. Social, Recreations, and Religious Workers  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-5.496 (0) hm: 𝜏𝜇=-4.563 (0) 63.8 
8. Lawyers and Judges  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.616 (1)  36.2 
9. Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-6.252 (0) hm: 𝜏𝜇=-6.293 (0) 47 
10. Technicians hm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.770 (1)   51.2 
11. Sales occupations hm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.374 (1)   51.3 
12. Administrative support occ. hm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.624 (1)   73.8 
Service occupations     
13. Household services  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.941 (1)   90 
14. Protective services hm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.064 (1)   21.2 
15. Food services hm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.371 (1)   56.4 
16. Health services  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-5.992 (0) hm: 𝜏𝜇=-6.069 (0) 88.8 
17. Cleaning and Building hm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.026 (1)   32.4 
18. Personal services  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-4.577 (0) hm: 𝜏𝜇=-4.501 (0) 78.5 
19.Farming, forestry, fishing hm: 𝜏𝑡=-0.871 (3)   17.6 
Precision production, craft, and repairs occ.     
20. Mechanics hm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.950 (1)   3.8 
21. Construction trades hm: 𝜏𝑡=-0.080 (2)   2.2 
22. Extractive occupations  hm: 𝜏𝑡=-3.385* (1) hm: 𝜏𝜇=-2.744* (1) 0.5 
23. Precision occupations hm: 𝜏𝑡=-2.370 (1)   32.7 
Operators, fabricators, and labourers     
24. Operators hm: 𝜏𝑡=-0.710 (3)   33 
25. Transportation occupations hm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.601 (2)   11.8 
26. Material moving occupations hm: 𝜏𝑡=-1.030 (2)   15.2 
27. Military occupations hm: 𝜏𝑡=-0.476 (4)   9.7 
Note: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, significance at the 5% level otherwise. 
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Table 5. US White women (WF): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 1968-2011 (43 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary  
earnings 
Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour 
share in 2011(%) 
Exec., Adm. and Man. occupations     
1. Managerial occupations wf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.672 (1)   41.3 
2. Management related occupations wf: 𝜏𝑡=-0.656 (3)   55.5 
Professional occupations     
3. Engineers and Scientists wf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.181 (1)   23.7 
4. Health diagnosing occ. wf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.237 (2)   77 
5. Teachers wf: 𝜏𝑡=-0.221 (2)   74.5 
6. Social Scientists and Urban Planners wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.603 (1)   53.2 
7. Social, Recreations, and Religious Workers wf: 𝜏𝑡=-0.462 (1)   63.8 
8. Lawyers and Judges wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.182 (2)   36.2 
9. Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.957 (1)   47 
10. Technicians wf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.567 (1)   51.2 
11. Sales occupations wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.697 (1)   51.3 
12. Administrative support occ. wf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.663 (1)   73.8 
Service occupations     
13. Household services  wf: 𝜏𝑡=-0.102 (2)   90 
14. Protective services  wf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.704 (1)  21.2 
15. Food services wf: 𝜏𝑡=-0.373 (3)   56.4 
16. Health services wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.603 (1)   88.8 
17. Cleaning and Building wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.282 (1)   32.4 
18. Personal services wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.530 (1)   78.5 
19.Farming, forestry, fishing wf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.699 (2)   17.6 
Precision production, craft, and repairs occ.     
20. Mechanics wf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.738 (1)   3.8 
21. Construction trades wf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.022 (3)   2.2 
22. Extractive occupations  wf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.714 (0) wf: 𝜏𝜇=-4.109 (0) 0.5 
23. Precision occupations  wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.278 (1)  32.7 
Operators, fabricators, and labourers     
24. Operators wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.084 (3)   33 
25. Transportation occupations  wf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.287* (3)  11.8 
26. Material moving occupations wf: 𝜏𝑡=0.703 (3)   15.2 
27. Military occupations wf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.273 (1)   9.7 
Note: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, significance at the 5% level otherwise. 
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Table 6. US Black women (BF): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 1968-2011 (43 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary  
earnings 
Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour 
share in 2011(%) 
Exec., Adm. and Man. occupations     
1. Managerial occupations bf: 𝜏𝑡=-0.981 (4)   41.3 
2. Management related occupations bf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.047 (2)   55.5 
Professional occupations     
3. Engineers and Scientists  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.334 (1)  23.7 
4. Health diagnosing occ. bf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.749 (1)   77 
5. Teachers bf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.878 (1)   74.5 
6. Social Scientists and Urban Planners  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.595 (1) bf: 𝜏𝜇=-2.632* (1) 53.2 
7. Social, Recreations, and Religious Workers  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.394 (1) bf: 𝜏𝜇=-3.543 (1) 63.8 
8. Lawyers and Judges  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.363 (1)  36.2 
9. Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.036 (1) bf: 𝜏𝜇=-3.750 (1) 47 
10. Technicians bf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.972 (2)   51.2 
11. Sales occupations bf: 𝜏𝑡=-0.164 (3)   51.3 
12. Administrative support occ. bf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.625 (2) bf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.320* (2)  73.8 
Service occupations     
13. Household services  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.189 (3)   90 
14. Protective services  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-6.674 (1)  21.2 
15. Food services bf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.189 (2)   56.4 
16. Health services bf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.226 (2)   88.8 
17. Cleaning and Building  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-5.687 (0) bf: 𝜏𝜇=-5.455 (0) 32.4 
18. Personal services bf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.314 (2)   78.5 
19.Farming, forestry, fishing bf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.792 (3)   17.6 
Precision production, craft, and repairs occ.     
20. Mechanics  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.212* (0) bf: 𝜏𝜇=-3.305 (1) 3.8 
21. Construction trades  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-7.352 (0) bf: 𝜏𝜇=-5.385 (0) 2.2 
22. Extractive occupations -- -- -- 0.5 
23. Precision occupations  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.651 (3)  32.7 
Operators, fabricators, and labourers     
24. Operators  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.575 (2)  33 
25. Transportation occupations  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.276 (1)  11.8 
26. Material moving occupations   bf: 𝜏𝜇=-5.511 (0) 15.2 
27. Military occupations  bf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.769 (1) bf: 𝜏𝜇=-2.766* (1) 9.7 
Note: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, significance at the 5% level otherwise. (--) indicates not enough observations to run ADF tests. 
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Table 7. US Hispanic women (HF): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 1971-2011 (40 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary  
earnings 
Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour 
share in 2011(%) 
Exec., Adm. and Man. occupations     
1. Managerial occupations hf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.845 (4)   41.3 
2. Management related occupations  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.992 (2)  55.5 
Professional occupations     
3. Engineers and Scientists  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.382* (3) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-2.829* (3) 23.7 
4. Health diagnosing occ.  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.782 (1)  77 
5. Teachers  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.556 (1) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-2.682* (1) 74.5 
6. Social Scientists and Urban Planners  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.386* (1) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-2.645* (1) 53.2 
7. Social, Recreations, and Religious Workers  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-6.694 (0) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-5.963 (0) 63.8 
8. Lawyers and Judges hf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.097 (1)   36.2 
9. Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.599 (1) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-3.669 (1) 47 
10. Technicians hf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.015 (2)   51.2 
11. Sales occupations hf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.721 (4)   51.3 
12. Administrative support occ. hf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.880 (1)   73.8 
Service occupations     
13. Household services   hf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.186* (1)  90 
14. Protective services  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.493 (1)  21.2 
15. Food services  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.029 (1)  56.4 
16. Health services  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.567 (1) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-2.735* (1) 88.8 
17. Cleaning and Building  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-3.970 (2)  32.4 
18. Personal services hf: 𝜏𝑡=-2.338 (2)   78.5 
19.Farming, forestry, fishing hf: 𝜏𝑡=-0.814 (3)   17.6 
Precision production, craft, and repairs occ.     
20. Mechanics  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-5.771 (0) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-5.249 (0) 3.8 
21. Construction trades  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-6.571 (0) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-6.608 (0) 2.2 
22. Extractive occupations -- -- -- 0.5 
23. Precision occupations  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.685 (1) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-3.888 (1) 32.7 
Operators, fabricators, and labourers     
24. Operators hf: 𝜏𝑡=-1.766 (2)   33 
25. Transportation occupations  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.364 (3)  11.8 
26. Material moving occupations  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.890 (0) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-4.935 (0) 15.2 
27. Military occupations  hf: 𝜏𝑡=-4.389 (0) hf: 𝜏𝜇=-3.484 (0) 9.7 
Note: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, significance at the 5% level otherwise. (--) indicates not enough observations to run ADF tests. 
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Table 8. UK White females (WF): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 2001Q2-2014Q3 (54 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary earnings Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour share across 
all years and quarters (%) 
1 Managers and senior officials  wf (grss):  = –4.47 (1) 
wf (net):  = –3.84 (1) 
 
34.85 
2 Professional occupations wf (grss): 
 
= –2.26 (3) 
wf (net):  = –2.86 (1) 
 
 
46.38 
3 Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
 wf (grss):  = –4.82 (1) 
wf (net):  = –4.44 (1) 
 
49.45 
4 Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 
wf (grss):  = –1.52 (1) 
wf (net):  = –3.18 (1) 
 
 
80.46 
5 Skilled trades occupations  wf (grss):  = –7.58 (2) 
wf (net):  = –7.04 (2) 
 
8.82 
6 Personal service occupations wf (grss):  = –2.20 (4) 
wf (net):  = –1.38 (4) 
 
 
84.60 
7 Sales and customer service 
occupations 
wf (net):  = –3.45 (1) wf (grss):  = –3.76 (1) 
 
 
69.48 
8 Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
 wf (grss):  = –3.53 (1) 
wf (net):  = –4.07 (1) 
 
14.16 
9 Elementary occupations wf (grss): 
 
= –1.33 (2) 
 
wf (net):  = –3.93 (1) 
 
47.62 
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Table 9. UK Non-white females (NWF): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 2001Q2-2014Q3 (54 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary earnings Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour share across 
all years and quarters (%) 
1 Managers and senior officials  nwf (grss):  = –5.90 (1) 
nwf (net):  = –4.31 (1) 
 
34.85 
2 Professional occupations  nwf (grss):  = –4.50 (1) 
nwf (net):  = –5.16 (1) 
 
46.38 
3 Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
 nwf (grss):  = –4.85 (1) 
nwf (net):  = –6.25 (1) 
 
49.45 
4 Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 
 nwf (grss):  = –6.08 (1) 
nwf (net):  = –4.91 (1) 
 
80.46 
5 Skilled trades occupations  nwf (grss):  = –4.12 (1) 
nwf (net):  = –4.13 (1) 
 
8.82 
6 Personal service occupations  nwf (grss):  = –4.11 (1) 
nwf (net):  = –4.76 (1) 
 
84.60 
7 Sales and customer service 
occupations 
nwf (grss):  = –3.25 (1) nwf (net):  = –3.68 (1) 
 
69.48 
8 Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
 nwf (grss):  = –5.60 (1) 
nwf (net):  = –5.84 (1) 
 
14.16 
9 Elementary occupations  nwf (grss):  = –4.30 (1) 
nwf (net):  = –4.84 (1) 
 
47.62 
 
25 
Table 10. UK White males (WM): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 2001Q2-2014Q3 (54 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary earnings Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour share across 
all years and quarters (%) 
1 Managers and senior officials  wm (grss):  = –4.96 (1) 
wm (net):  = –5.07 (1) 
 
34.85 
2 Professional occupations  wm (grss):  = –6.86 (1) 
wm (net):  = –6.14 (1) 
 
46.38 
3 Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
 wm (grss):  = –3.64 (1) 
wm (net):  = –3.13 (1) 
 
49.45 
4 Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 
wm (net):  = –2.58 (2) wm (grss):  = –4.94 (1) 
 
 
80.46 
5 Skilled trades occupations  wm (grss):  = –-4.41 (1) 
wm (net):  = –3.87 (1) 
 
8.82 
6 Personal service occupations wm (grss):  = –2.01 (3) 
wm (net):  = –2.93 (3) 
 
 
84.60 
7 Sales and customer service 
occupations 
 wm (grss):  = –3.94 (1) 
wm (net):  = –3.53 (1) 
 
69.48 
8 Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
wm (grss):  = –3.13 (1) 
wm (net):  = –1.94 (3) 
 
 
14.16 
9 Elementary occupations wm (grss):  = –1.61 (3) 
wm (net):  = –0.57 (3) 
 
 
47.62 
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Table 11. UK Non-white males (NWM): Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on group earnings by occupation in the period 2001Q2-2014Q3 (54 obs.) 
 Non-stationary  
earnings 
Trend-stationary earnings Stationary  
earnings 
Female labour share across 
all years and quarters (%) 
1 Managers and senior officials  nwm (grss):  = –4.32 (1) 
nwm (net):  = –4.34 (1) 
 
34.85 
2 Professional occupations  nwm (grss):  = –5.31 (1) 
nwm (net):  = –5.36 (1) 
 
46.38 
3 Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
 nwm (grss):  = –5.23 (1) 
nwm (net):  = –5.36 (1) 
 
49.45 
4 Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 
nwm (grss):  = –2.54 (3) 
 
nwm (net):  = –5.30 (1) 
 
80.46 
5 Skilled trades occupations  nwm (grss):  = –3.49 (3) 
nwm (net):  = –5.08 (1) 
 
8.82 
6 Personal service occupations  nwm (grss):  = –4.38 (1) 
nwm (net):  = –3.66 (1) 
 
84.60 
7 Sales and customer service 
occupations 
 nwm (grss):  = –3.52 (1) 
nwm (net):  = –3.87 (1) 
 
69.48 
8 Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
 nwm (grss):  = –4.43 (1) 
nwm (net):  = –4.42 (1) 
 
14.16 
9 Elementary occupations  nwm (grss):  = –3.66 (1) 
nwm (net):  = –4.00 (1) 
 
47.62 
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Endnotes 
1 Stryker and Burke (2000) provide an exhaustive historical account of the Theory of Identity. 
                                                          
